Cepei & IDOS resource collection
UN Reform Reading Room
An annotated collection of blogs, media contributions and analyses on the future of the United Nations. Filter by theme, search the summaries, and open the original source.
Although the piece focuses on the UN's peace and security mandate, its reform recommendations apply broadly across the UN system. Facing unprecedented financial strain, the UN must reform along five lines: prioritise where impact is achievable, better integrate existing tools, elevate Secretary-General leadership, anchor reform in sustained member-state engagement and insistence, and rebuild public confidence. The current SG is assessed as having underused his good offices; the 2026 election therefore represents a critical opportunity to install a leader who drives institutional change. Reform also requires a supporting coalition of member states – the Liechtenstein-led Veto Initiative demonstrates that change is achievable through collective will. Additionally, the UN's long-term relevance depends on restoring public trust.
The author argues that the Global South's campaign for UN reform fundamentally challenges entrenched asymmetries in international authority, particularly the unequal power to define reform itself. While Northern states frame reform as a question of institutional efficiency and performance, the South views it as a structural issue requiring redistribution of decision-making power through greater representation, fairer financial governance, and stronger development-oriented multilateralism. These divergent understandings persist because the North retains disproportionate influence over knowledge and agenda-setting, shaping which problems are recognised and which solutions appear legitimate. For the Global South, meaningful reform therefore requires not just procedural adjustments, but a fundamental rebalancing of who holds authority within the multilateral system.
The Trump-Xi Beijing summit stabilised US-China relations but left the deeper crisis of global governance unresolved. Drawing on historical parallels – the Concert of Vienna, its eventual collapse, and the UN's founding logic – the author argues that current global governance institutions are drifting toward a rupture. Rules remain unchanged while the world they govern moves on. The UN's foundational contradiction between sovereign equality and great-power veto is now compounded by the governance gap in AI, autonomous weapons, climate and others. They are collective-action problems and addressing them requires the kind of cross-national research and dialogue that great-power friction is currently making harder. The ideas the next UN Secretary-General will need are already being developed outside formal institutions – and must be allowed to circulate. The State of the UN: Reality and Reform Needs
Designing the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) will be among the incoming UN Secretary-General's most consequential decisions, requiring careful planning well before inauguration on January 1, 2027. Though the EOSG has expanded significantly since 1946, its responsibilities remain formally vague, with influence depending heavily on personalities and relationships rather than mandates. Key positions – the chef de cabinet, deputy secretary-general, and senior policy coordination roles – have shifted considerably across administrations, reflecting an unresolved tension between centralised control and delegation. This tension carries particular weight for system-wide coordination: the next Secretary-General must choose between a directive EOSG or a leaner one that empowers the broader UN system. Personnel choices will matter as much as structure.
The author argues that the next UN Secretary-General must move beyond the symbolic 100-day benchmark and design a 1,000-day strategic agenda to confront the UN’s governance crisis. Drawing on a new CEPEI–IDOS report, the piece frames it as a “triple disconnect” between authority, money and voice: executive boards and ECOSOC oversee only 13% of UN development funding, earmarked contributions flow through informal donor channels, and Global South countries have limited voice. Previous Secretaries-General, the author contends, overestimated their managerial reach and underused their network and Charter powers (including Article 99). The next SG should make power visible, realign money with governance, and embed inclusion as a governance standard. The window is now – what remains is political will.
The author argues that austerity-driven reforms are undermining the UN's effectiveness rather than enhancing it. Member states opt for uniform budget cuts instead of addressing the structural gap between mandates and resources. By framing these gaps as management issues, they avoid political responsibility, risking putting operationally essential functions like mediation and peacebuilding at risk. Though cuts seem reversible, they cause lasting damage, deepening the mandate-resource gap and weakening institutional trust, effectiveness, and capacity. Conditionality lets major contributors weaponise arrears to impose UN cuts without political vision, producing managed decline rather than reform. The author urges the next Secretary-General to resist across-the-board reductions, demand transparency on mandate-resource gaps, and pursue political vision.
With the UN increasingly sidelined amid global crises, the 2026 SG election is framed as the institution's most urgent reform lever. Three qualities define a candidate that the UN needs: force of personality, including not only capacity to sit with presidents and prime ministers as a peer but also willingness to use modern communications to restore the UN's presence; demonstrated readiness to take political and personal risks rather than retreat into procedural caution; and hands-on problem-solving focused on concrete outcomes over abstract frameworks. The selection process, however, risks producing a lowest-common-denominator consensus candidate acceptable to all five permanent Security Council members but lacking the boldness the moment demands. Without a transformative leader, the UN faces permanent marginalisation.
The author argues that UN reform will not persuade the Trump administration to meet US financial obligations. Washington's push for quick win reforms is disingenuous, paired with intentions to withhold funding from major UN bodies. US non-payment weakens the organisation financially and opens space for China's influence, particularly through trust funds – which the US itself criticises. The author calls on the Secretariat and Member States to accept a new funding reality, recognising that US contributions are unreliable. He stresses pursuing reforms on donor-driven trust funds and staff compensation, not as concessions to the US but because such measures are necessary. However, arbitrary budget cuts risk further weakening the UN's ability to implement its mandates.
The UN80 reform faces challenges from geopolitical polarisation, funding crises to UN's outdated architecture, which struggles with 21st-century multidimensional challenges. The 2018 reforms led by Secretary-General introduced empowered Resident Coordinators to foster integration and coherence among UN agencies at country level, yielding improvements in collaboration and efficiency. However, structural constraints – lack of central authority, persistent earmarking, and unresolved roles for regional commissions – hinder full implementation, leaving UNDS reform unfinished business. The author argues that while now is perhaps not the time for major structural overhaul, incremental yet ambitious reforms targeting leadership, incentives, and systems can drive meaningful progress, provided member states sustain political will, discipline, coordination, and financial commitment.
António Guterres' tenure as UN Secretary-General has driven significant reform ambitions through initiatives like Our Common Agenda, UN2.0, and UNDS reform. The UN80 process offers a chance to consolidate these gains and address issues that have proven reform-resistant. While mergers of UNDP/UNOPS and UN Women/UNFPA are under consideration, a potential merger of the UN's development and humanitarian coordination mechanisms – DCO and OCHA – has yet to be proposed, despite their substantially similar work and their serving the same “two-hatted” individual at the country level – the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. Bringing these functional services together under one roof could yield potential synergies and efficiencies and may inject welcome new dynamics into decades-old efforts to reduce duplication and improve the linkages between these two ecosystems. Equally important is the next Deputy Secretary-General appointment, given the significant political and institutional investment built around that role in driving the development agenda over the past seven years.
The authors argue that without major reform, the UN risks becoming a multilateral sideshow. Even if no longer supported in its entirety, specialised agencies – such as ICAO and ITU – should survive given their added value in regulating shared systems, managing global public goods, and delivering services no single country can provide alone. UN80 acknowledged the crisis of the system, but stopped short of structural reform. The three aspects requiring not repair but structural repositioning include: expanding the Security Council; significantly strengthening the Secretary-General's proactive power; and redefining UN membership for the modern era, potentially including transnational corporations and other global private sector entities.
The UN development system suffers from a “triple disconnect”: those formally responsible for governance lack control over resources; major donors operate outside formal oversight; and those most affected by UN programmes have the least influence over priorities. These dynamics create a “fairness deficit” that UN80’s technical fixes cannot resolve. Reform addressing these imbalances depends on political choices by member states, notably those with significant financial and diplomatic influence. However, the Secretary-General has four levers to advance meaningful reform: symbolically, shaping narratives around effective multilateralism; managerially, using appointments and transparency practices; politically, convening coalitions across divides; and constitutionally, invoking Article 99 to bring governance failures directly to member states' attention.
Multilateralism is not collapsing, it is being contested. The post-1945 order encoded a distribution of authority that no longer reflects geopolitical realities, and major powers increasingly disagree on who should shape institutions – which the system still needs – and how far sovereignty should yield to collective restraint. The task now is to design multilateralism capable of functioning under strategic rivalry – without assuming consensus – by reducing incentives to obstruct institutions and expanding space for problem-solving. This requires 1) improving legitimacy, 2) preserve functionality, and 3) lowering the temperature of rivalry. Within the UN, legitimacy is existential: rules lose authority when they appear binding for some but optional for other, more powerful ones. While a single global regime is unlikely, partial alignment is still possible, such as shared baseline expectations on safety, transparency, and accountability that lower systemic risk without requiring political convergence.
Highlighting the centrality of country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) to the ongoing humanitarian reset, the authors question CBPFs’ value for local and national actors. Although CBPFs are attractive to donors – helping them meet their localisation commitments and sidestep management and compliance challenges – by design they remain inaccessible to many local and national actors due to regulatory barriers. Drawing on the example of US funding to CBPFs, the authors show that donor influence through earmarking, advisory boards, and ideological conditioning further restricts inclusive action and poses risks of politicisation, thematic and geographic limitations, undermining principled humanitarian action. If the aim is to design and deliver assistance that is tailored to local dynamics and strengthens local leadership, the path forward is to prioritise pooled mechanisms that are led and designed by local actors.
The author contends that budget cuts and austerity will not lead to meaningful UN reform or positive changes, and that strengthening of the UN requires institutional and political investment as well as moving beyond a strictly state-centered model to enhance the organisation’s democratic character. One proposal is the creation of a world parliament – a vision that could be implemented incrementally in a UN context and that has strong popular backing, according to a new survey, with support being strongest in the Global South and in less democratic environments. The author concludes that the creation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly, potentially initiated through a UN Charter review, would bolster UN oversight, multilateralism, and democracy.
UN transitions – reconfigurations of the UN presence in a country involving the establishment and expansion or drawdown and closure of a peace operation – have implications for UN country teams. Chen challenges the assumption that transitions take place amid stability and involve a straightforward hand-off from the peace operation to the UN country team. Country teams with their distinct expertise, priorities, and host-state relationships are often sidelined during transition planning. Expectations that country teams absorb peacekeeping-specific responsibilities – e.g. physical protection of civilians – overlook their own mandates and risk undermining their core work. Chen advocates a modular and networked approach that distributes post-transition tasks across the UN system according to comparative advantage. The Secretariat and member states must assess post-mandate requirements from the perspective of those responsible for delivering them.
The authors argue that the creation of the Board of Peace (BoP) by Trump is a result of the lack of concrete outcomes from the UN’s reform efforts, and that its creation has weakened the UN’s authority, shifting its role in Gaza to that of a “legitimizer and formal overseer”. Although the BoP operates under UNSC Resolution 2803, it is dominated by a prominent individual personality – Trump – which raises concerns about legitimacy and longevity of the body. Nevertheless, its success in Gaza could diminish the UN’s relevance, particularly if expanded to other conflicts. Against this backdrop, middle powers and the Global South should serve as a “new moral force” to preserve the multilateral authority of the UN.
Reflecting on an evaluation of UNDP’s Funding Windows, the author argues that without addressing the underlying incentives of voluntary funding, mechanisms designed to restore strategic flexibility risk reproducing the fragmentation of earmarked funding, just under a different label. While flexible funding can deliver value in crisis response and innovation, it is only effective when protected from routine project-financing pressures. The Funding Windows case demonstrates that the organisational efficiency and mandate streamlining addressed by UN80, while necessary, are insufficient. The challenge lies not in managing the UN development system more efficiently within existing financing constraints, but in critically assessing whether the current financing model itself remains fit for purpose.
Outlining the UN funding crisis – caused primarily by the US, but also other Western donors reducing their contributions to the UN system – the author argues that there is an urgent need to reform a system based on the outdated assumption that all members pay their contributions in full and on time. While one option would be for other countries to step in with voluntary contributions to cover the shortfall caused by US non-payment, those members have limited appetite to step in for the bad payers. More far-reaching proposals include allowing the UN to issue bonds and raise funds on financial markets. Given the UN’ grant-focused work, however, market borrowing would likely provide only a temporary solution to liquidity shortfalls, for example, bridging funding gaps until major funders clear their outstanding payments.
While acknowledging the organisation’s severe liquidity crisis, largely driven by US non-payment, Chen criticises the UNSG for recycling outdated proposals, prioritising narrative management, shifting blame to member states, and implementing counterproductive budget cuts. The misguided cuts advanced through UN80 only served to reduce funding the Secretariat will be able to receive from member states for 2026, worsening the crisis. The SG has also avoided and suppressed contingency planning within the Secretariat. Chen argues the SG is not as powerless as he claims to be and retains tools to mitigate the crisis. The first step would be to include planning for a range of scenarios, including one in which the US fails to pay the bulk of its assessed contributions.
In his response to the UN liquidity crisis and the SG’s letter to member states, the author argues that the SG has a duty to act to prevent institutional failure while forcing political resolution. During past peacekeeping financing crises, liquidity shortfalls, and payroll emergencies, SGs have repeatedly acted at the edge of formal authority to keep the UN functioning. These actions were controversial, flagged by auditors, and criticised by member states; yet, they were justified post factum because the alternative – operational paralysis or collapse – was politically unacceptable. Hence, a necessity-based deviation by the SG from current regulations, framed as temporary, reversible, and reported immediately to the GA, is required. It ensures institutional survival, while respecting the ultimate authority of member states.
The author argues that President Trump’s second-term policies are accelerating the long-standing erosion of the international legal order. Trump’s proposed Board of Peace aspires to replace the UN or at least the Security Council, substituting the veto of the P5 with a single veto vested in Trump himself. Domestically, Trump can prevail only if Congress, the Supreme Court, and ultimately, the US electorate itself allow him to pursue his unconstitutional acts. Internationally, he can only prevail if the Security Council, the General Assembly and UN member states fail to enforce Security Council Resolution 2803, ending the war in Gaza, fail to adequately fund the UN and its mandates, and fail to uphold the UN Charter and ICJ rulings.
The author argues that the Trump administration has inadvertently highlighted long-standing problems within the UN system: fragmentation, mandate creep, and institutional duplication. However, the US’ uncoordinated and ill-informed unilateralism is not a solution. Rather than political exit, what is required is strategic political coordination: member states working collectively to identify genuine duplication, merge overlapping mandates, strengthen core functions, and sunset certain entities. This has to be done not through neglect or budgetary starvation, but through deliberate, negotiated consolidation.
For the UN, AI offers an opportunity to strengthen core systems like procurement and service delivery, and to better meet constituents’ needs at greater speed, scale, and impact. With an explicit link to UN80, Microsoft has promised a "multi-million-dollar investment" in an innovation fund, an "affordable pricing" commitment until 2027, and offers AI-training for UN staff. This initiative indicates that the multinational company does not want to lose the UN as a global customer in a world where divesting from US companies could become a response to US undermining of the global order and questioning of the UN. Whether this initiative will be enough is questionable.
The author argues that the UN has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to endure hard power politics through adaption. There are mechanisms that allow action even when great power rivalry creates deadlock. A crucial element to this adaptability are legislative procedures perceived as fair and transparent by member states, which can create legitimacy and enable agency and autonomy to act – for example, shifting decision-making from the Security Council to the General Assembly. Additionally, adaptation has been facilitated by collaboration between member states and impartial, technically skilled UN staff, as well as the adherence to the UN Charter.
Thoki and Zimmermann argue that far-right governments can shape how international organisations operate. Through earmarked funding, they steer organisational priorities towards anti-migration agendas, for example by concentrating resources on migrant-return projects. This migration-focused funding often comes at the expense of other areas, such as social protection or democracy promotion. Although UN organisations’ mandates constrain the types of project funding they are willing to accept, thereby limiting far-right governments’s ability to fully implement their preferences, opportunities for influence remain. And if further opportunities arise, there is a growing risk of far-right governments repurposing UN agencies to implement their core agendas.
The author argues that Trump’s decision to cease participation in or funding to 31 UN entities has limited practical effect. The only UN organisation the US will actually be withdrawing from is UNFCCC. The other listed entities are part of the UN and not independent international organisations. Moreover, many organisations on the list stopped receiving US funding already last year when Trump took office. Finally, several entities on the list are intergovernmental bodies of which the US is not a member in the first place. Nevertheless, although the effects of current decision are marginal, it leaves open the possibility of future withdrawals.
2025 marked an unprecedented collapse in the global humanitarian system, driven less by rising need than by a sharp contraction in political will and funding. Unresolved conflicts, climate shocks, and attacks on aid workers collided with donor retrenchment and fatigue, culminating in what Vigersky terms a “Great Aid Recession”, with no clear path to recovery in 2026. The aid community now faces the tension between immediate life-saving services and the long-term imperative of modernising a strained humanitarian system. Success could unlock renewed donor and private support, but failure risks rising hunger and deprivation on a potentially devastating scale.
The author highlights that the UN human rights system is in survival mode due to severe funding shortfalls, with $90 million of the OHCHR’s $246 million budget unpaid, leading to 300 job cuts and reduced operations. As a result, investigations, country visits, and treaty compliance evaluations have been scaled back, leaving rights defenders exposed while anti-rights and anti-gender movements grow well funded. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council faces similar strain, with meetings and reports curtailed and essential services like interpretation and technical support limited. The proposed 15 percent budget reduction under UN80 disproportionately affects an already underfunded and overstretched pillar. The author emphasises that fully funding UN dues is essential to sustain human rights protection worldwide.
The author argues that UN80 is not transformative effort but a survival response to severe budget cuts. The UN is cutting posts, consolidating payroll, and trimming administrative costs, yet these austerity measures cannot replace real reform. Instead, the author suggests, the following has to be done. First, Member States need to pay arrears. Second, they also need to stop adding new mandates while ignoring those already sitting unfunded. Third, the UN needs to consolidate administrative systems. Fourth, the repetitive administrative work should be moved to lower-cost duty stations, shifting the paperwork, not the expertise. Finally, the UN needs to digitize its systems.
The author argues that current UN reform efforts prioritise urgency over deliberation, producing outputs that appear active but lack substantive impact. Jumping to incremental adjustments, reform proposals bypass essential questions: 1) How should a body at hand function if designed for its actual purpose?; 2) What administrative improvements can be made without touching political red lines?; 3) What structural changes require new political agreements and who needs to agree? To deliver impact, reforms must be developed under different conditions: UN80 should slow down, take a realistic view of required time, create protected time for synthesis and alignment, prioritise key reforms, and allow leadership to explain what is blocked and what requires political agreement. Otherwise, reform remains performative, not transformative.
At the 2025 High-Level Week, over 100 national statements called for Security Council reform, reflecting rising pressure to restructure the UN’s only body with binding authority. Reform debates centre on expanding representation to enhance the Council’s legitimacy and effectiveness. However, the persistence of the veto remains a core obstacle to meaningful reform and a source of growing frustration with the UN’s collective framework. The authors warn of the consequences of failing to act and implement reforms, citing the rise of “neo-sovereigntist” regimes in the Sahel as an example. They argue that reforms must address the root causes of discontent that have eroded faith in the multilateral system rather than follow a logic of institutional survival. Otherwise, the UN risks losing relevance in a multipolar, fragmented world.
The author argues that lowering the US share of assessed budgets as a solution to the liquidity crisis is politically unrealistic and structurally impractical. Negotiations over the scales of assessments are a zero-sum game: decrease in one country’s share forces others to pay more, rendering compromise impossible. Another obstacle is procedural – the Secretary-General cannot propose revisions. Altering the ceiling would also affect China, significantly increasing the amount that other Member States would have to shoulder. Finally, the US might prefer to maintain its current share, both as leverage and to support increasing the number of US nationals in the Secretariat, a priority of the current administration. The author suggests that instead of focusing on unrealistic changes, it is better to focus on proposals designed around the decision-making processes and balance of interests at the UN.
Highlighting the UN’s paralysis, the author argues that reform is not optional but essential. He praises the 10 elected members of the UNSC, who, though lacking veto power, are freer to broker compromise and break the P5’s gridlock—showing that legitimacy stems from participation, not privilege. He also emphasises the UNGA’s role when the UNSC cannot act and urges strengthening its moral weight through practical impact: better coordination with humanitarian agencies, follow-up mechanisms that sustain resolutions beyond the vote, and deeper cooperation with regional organisations such as the AU, ASEAN, and the EU – that often detect crises first. The latter should be treated as real partners and first respondents, as they bring proximity, cultural fluency, and credibility.
The author argues that the UN80 Action Plan has potential to advance meaningful reform, but its success depends on how change is managed, not merely on what is proposed. The Plan offers a clear outline of reform management and governance – an aspect research shows is as crucial to UN reform as the content itself. It also opens space for Member State engagement, though details on formal and informal participation through legislative bodies remain vague. An important weakness of the Plan is the absence of any process or responsibility to consult staff. The author suggests evaluating reform proposals by asking: do they address both Member State and staff concerns, and do they present a realistic plan to change processes and behaviour while improving efficiency?
The author argues that the UN takes on more mandates, coordination mechanisms, and projects, but its influence has not grown. Furthermore, it still operates largely as an aid-delivery system, even though global development has moved beyond aid. As a result, the UN competes for funds, pursues earmarked projects, and expands mandates, which dilutes its political voice. Building on this, the author suggests a “smaller, smarter and more political UN” that (1) acts as a trusted knowledge facilitator, (2) engages in public advocacy, (3) applies universality in practice, and (4) serves as an actor of last resort in fragile settings. The authors conclude that reform should focus on relevance and adapting to the current situation, helping countries transition from aid dependence to national ownership, reclaiming the UN’s political role, and restoring its Charter-based vision of universality.
The author argues that the UN Headquarters should be relocated outside the territory of the P5 – e.g. to Canada, Switzerland or Brazil – to signal commitment to a fairer global order. The US, as the current host, has increasingly proven unfit to host the world’s leading multilateral institution, as shown during the most recent General Assembly high-level week. Through actions such as revoking visas for diplomats, the US government diverges from the UN’s mandate to uphold international law and state sovereignty, subjecting the UN to its own domestic politics and agendas. Relocating the UN Headquarters, or adopting a decentralised model with multiple host countries, would not resolve all the UN’s challenges but could improve remove a recurring barrier to participation and help restore confidence in the organisation’s neutrality.
Although the Secretary-General noted that “UN80 is not about solving the financial crisis but about making the UN sustainable,” reform and solvency are inseparable. Reforms cannot endure without financial stability, and member states will not pay fully or on time without credible reform. The UN’s outdated financial structure, reliant on voluntary discipline, leaves it vulnerable when political will erodes. Currently operating on cash availability rather than mandates, the UN needs a solvency framework preceding reform. Restoring solvency requires a systemic review of funding and cash management and political responsibility. Three principles should guide this effort: transparency – real-time disclosure of liquidity; predictability – adequate reserves or revolving liquidity facilities; and accountability – political commitments from major contributors linking timely payments to reform outcomes.
The author highlights an important issue from the UN80 mandate implementation review: the ever-increasing (mis)use of the phrase “within existing resources”. He argues that inconsistent interpretation and invoking of the phrase undermine coherent funding of mandates. Specifically, some bodies invoke the phrase despite lacking budgetary authority, while the SG often overlooks that the “within existing resources” clause applies only to the current budget cycle. The phrase does not prevent the SG from seeking additional resources in future budgets or informing the GA that implementation might be unrealistic. Against this backdrop, the informal ad hoc working group on the mandate implementation review provides an opportunity to remind all stakeholders of their respective roles and responsibilities for implementing decisions on budgetary authority.
The authors argue that the UN has lost its constitutional balance and that very powers that shaped the UN Charter are also those contributing to its erosion. When the Charter’s principles can be suspended by the powerful – through unilateral actions that defy its core norms – the rules-based order it established loses its credibility. The problem lies in the acceptance of double standards, which undermines the UN’s authority from within. This imbalance is also reflected in the UN’s financial structure. A more equitable system, capping assessed contributions to 10 percent, would distribute financial responsibility more fairly, expand the sense of ownership across the membership, and reduce the perception that the UN is beholden by its largest donors.
The author reports on an investigation conducted by the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), which argues that China and Russia have systematically undermined the UN’s human rights work by hijacking technical budget committees in New York, turning them into a tool for geopolitical maneuvering, and trying to defund the OHCHR. Using the ACABQ and the Fifth Committee, China and Russia have sought to reduce or block funding for investigations into abuses in countries like Ukraine, Belarus, Venezuela, and North Korea. China works quietly through influence in the G77, while Russia is an “outspoken spoiler”. This strategy, combined with US aid cuts to the UN’s Human Rights Office and the Human Rights Council, threatens to weaken the UN human rights pillar.
The author argues that the US is retreating from and redefining the postwar multilateral order. Under Trump, multilateral reform processes like UN80 are used as tools to enforce austerity and ideological alignment. The US defunds the UN, causing its dysfunction, and then uses that dysfunction as proof that multilateralism itself has failed. This is less fiscal conservatism than an ideological contest that recasts cooperation as overreach. The current US approach to the UN carries significant costs: fragmented legitimacy, reduced implementation capacity, and the risk that norms agreed upon without the buy-in of major powers remain aspirational rather than actionable.
The authors argue that incremental UN reform has failed and that cosmetic fixes are insufficient to make the UN the body the world needs. They propose a comprehensive review of the UN Charter, which currently is silent on global challenges like climate change or cyber warfare. Such a review could reinvigorate the UN, enabling it to overcome the current crisis and emerge stronger and more fit for purpose. While this process risks exposing divisions in the UN and weakening the Charter, these risks must be weighed against the consequences of inaction. The risks can be mitigated by ring-fencing contentious issues like human rights and sovereignty, and focusing on, establishing a new environmental council, strengthening democratic participation, and restructuring the UN Security Council.
The author takes stock of the UN’s AI ecosystem, which broadly divides into two tracks: developing global norms and governance, and hands-on capacity-building. He suggests that the UN80 Initiative presents an opportunity for the UN to better use AI and become an active practitioner of emerging technologies, improving how the organisation functions, from mandate rationalisation to efficiency savings. Yet, the political challenge surrounding the UN’s adoption of AI is unavoidable. To navigate it, the UN needs to balance expert inputs with member state involvement, fostering shared purpose and trust while anchoring innovation in the organisation’s values and commitment to collective progress.
The author scrutinises proposals for reforming the UNDS presented in the recent UN80 report. While the report acknowledges long-standing challenges, namely the fragmentation and costliness of the system, it fails to address deeper structural issues related to financing and governance of the UNDS, silos and integration, and focus on service delivery. To make the system fit for purpose, reforms must focus on enabling countries to mobilise the means of implementation and strengthening the alignment with the FfD process. An even bolder approach would be to constructively deconstruct the UNDS and reimagine it by asking: What would the UNDS look like if it were designed today?
The author argues that for the UN to achieve more than cosmetic reforms focused merely on cost saving, member states need a far-sighted vision of how a reformed UN will managed the so-called “long problems”. The UN has a role to address this – its special envoy for future generations, who could provide a unifying storyline to drive more meaningful structural changes and ensure that decisions about the UN’s architecture and priorities account for long-term risks and impacts. The envoy could also serve as an ombudsperson for those underrepresented in UN processes, thereby making UN80 more transparent and participatory. For these reasons, the author argues, member states should reverse their decision to remove the position from the 2026 budget.
The author critically examines the UN80 reform proposals from a humanitarian perspective, arguing that the UN suffers from the “main character syndrome”. The proposals continue to assume that the best way forward for the global emergency response ecosystem is with the UN firmly at the centre, while giving minimal consideration to local approaches and civil society. The humanitarian response ecosystem is evolving, and the UN can play other roles beyond direct aid delivery. Overlooked amid the Humanitarian Reset and UN80 discussions is the system’s actual reform agenda, the Grand Bargain, which brings together donors, NGOs, civil society, and UN agencies. Although it offers a quite representative forum, it lacks institutional power and enforcement capacity to drive substantial change.
The author argues that the US is not abandoning aid to developing countries altogether but reshaping it around pure self-interest. USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and International Development Finance Corporation have been rejigged to serve this new agenda. In a nutshell, anything that does not turn a profit must serve a narrow set of priorities to avoid being considered a waste of public funds. These set of priorities define what Trump is willing to spend money on. First, supporting friendly leaders and ideological allies such as Milei of Argentina. Second, hurting rivals, e.g. China. Third, advancing domestic industrial policy, following the idea that foreign assistance must solve American problems.
The author outlines why geopolitics is an important factor in development in a multipolar world. First, multipolarity will escalate global geopolitical competition, pushing high-income countries to tie their aid more explicitly to their strategic foreign policy objectives. This might not be entirely bad, as it will (“hopefully”) strengthen developing countries’ agency in setting their own development agenda. Second, the ongoing decline of the authority and influence of Western states will impact development practice. As Western dominance fades, so too will the influence of its ideas and preferred modes of development practice. The institutionalised top-down paternalism with its “best practices” and lowest common denominator compacts like SDGs is likely to lose ground to alternative approaches emphasising transformative structural change.
The author argues that international institutions, albeit flawed, remain resilient and are essential for fostering international cooperation and order. The UN, in particular, can regain its diplomatic and structural significance, but only if it undergoes systematic reforms reflecting current geopolitical realities. With its universal membership and broad institutional range, the UN continues to serve as a key forum for international dialogue in a polirising, yet globalised world. Its humanitarian and peacebuilding efforts have been impactful, and despite its flaws, the UN fills the ‘institutional’ gap and acts as a ‘global agent’ for multilateral negotiations.
The author argues that Xi’s absence from this year’s UNGA is symbolically and practically significant, reflecting China’s changing strategy towards the UN. Notably, Xi presented the “Global Governance Initiative” (GGI), China’s vision of how to reform the international order, including the UN, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation rather than at the UN. This underscores how China views the organisation: while China values the UN, it increasingly prioritises its own minilateral groups for the most meaningful engagement. China seeks to align basic UN principles with its own interests by launching new initiatives that it then seeks to tie into the UN framework, rather than by strengthening the existing UN bodies through expanded funding or engagement.
The author argues that the rollout of UN80 – which essentially became an example of performative reform – risks handicapping the organisation rather than helping it manage the current crisis. The expectation that cost-cutting and reform would bring back US contributions has not materialised. Instead, UN80 risks exacerbating the liquidity crisis, precipitating a loss of talent, and undermining the ability of the next SG to define a path forward for multilateralism. Rather than exacerbating the financial strain with cuts, the current SG should focus on keeping the Secretariat afloat, thereby giving his successor the space to define their vision for the role of the UN and align the Secretariat accordingly.
The author states that the problem with aid is not resources but political will. With that will weaker than ever, the focus should go beyond the 0.7% ODA target. Today’s crisis is less about finances and more about legitimacy and purpose of aid. When the system faltered, almost no leaders from the Global South have rushed to defend it and this silence is meaningful. In the current multipolar development finances landscape, recipient countries can shop for alternative donors. Hence, money is no longer the key issue; it is more about trust, credibility, and reliability. The way forward in this regard is to empower countries to lead their own development efforts, refocus on transformation, and build sustainable financing in developing countries.
The authors suggest four scenarios for the US position in global aid, development and humanitarian, in 2035. 1. America returns: Trump-style nationalism is voted out, and the US reinvests in soft power tools, focusing on greater localisation and rethinking past practices that pushed partners towards China. 2. China leads: US leaders avoid costly foreign aid commitments, focusing on domestic issues, while China shapes the international system to align with its priorities. 3. Aid adrift: Post-Trump policymakers, constrained by internal challenges, revert to status quo ante. Funding levels are still low, leaving the US a major player but in a reduced space as others fail to fill the gap. 4. Nationalism unbound: Nationalism dominates and US aid ends, except for projects signaling US support for particular partners. The US withdraws UN funding, bullies other aid actors, and blocks climate action, fracturing the international system further.
With Trump’s return to the White House, the UN faces three scenarios: going rogue, decaying, and turning Trumpian. First, US abandonment could make the UN more independent, but also create a vacuum for China and Russia to claim leadership. Second, the UN might survive with selective US participation, becoming more fragmented and drifting towards decay. The final scenario is a Trumpian reinvention and a “MAGAfied” UN. In the end, as noted in the article, much depends on the whims of Trump and the skill of the next UN Secretary-General.
The Elders, a group of independent global leaders founded by Nelson Mandela, call on political leaders to implement ambitious change in four areas: revitalising the international peace and security architecture; creating a new model of global solidarity with equitable financing and inclusive governance; making a collective effort to invest in public goods; and overhauling representation within the multilateral system. The latter includes ending the practice of national ring-fencing of senior UN posts and ensuring that candidates for such posts are not required to secure backing of their national governments, thereby increasing their independence. Governments willing to act should press ahead without those choosing isolation, while keeping the door open for future engagement
The author suggests that UN80 reforms create space not only to address current financial crisis but also to advance forward-looking ideas that could make the UN more “just, democratic, equitable, and representative of today’s world”. Many governments reduce or withhold funding to the UN because their parliaments and citizens see little value in supporting the UN but better citizen representation in multilateral processes could enhance legitimacy and increase willingness to fund the organisation. Over time, this can lead to a positive return on investment. Framing reforms this way could shift UN80 from a defensive, cost-cutting exercise to a forward-looking reform debate.
The author argues that the UN struggles to convince member states and their publics that it is a transparent organisation worth investing in. Drawing on research on aid transparency, the author examines how the UN implements transparency and suggests ways to address its challenges. First, UN practitioners should tailor their communication to their target audience. Second, they should engage not only with mediators such as media and think tanks but also with the wider public. Finally, UN leadership should proactively highlight both UN’s transparency practices and various governance processes that reinforce that transparency, in addition to sharing actual transparency information.
The article examines the limits of UN reform as revealed by the UN 80 Initiative and suggests how member states can move beyond performative processes towards actionable reform options. In its current form, UN80 is reactive, focused on budgetary triage rather than a systemic renewal. It avoids a structural recalibration of its purposes, mandates, and priorities, resulting in reform without redesign. Reform must be reconnected to political purpose, with member states engaged not only as reviewers of proposals but also as co-authors of institutional reform and with internal leadership matched by structured, participatory engagement.
The authors urge shifting UN reform’s focus from efficiency to purpose. While bureaucracy has contributed to the system’s failure to fully deliver on prevention, protection, and accountability, member states have also played a part. They preserved structures consolidating inequity and injustice and favouring solutions that are politically “easier” to achieve. How to move forward? 1) UN should look at how departmental mergers could drive closer cooperation across its three pillars; 2) Mergers must not compromise expertise and functions; 3) Reform discussions must include civil society and communities most affected by the implementation of mandates.
The authors argue that to move beyond cost-cutting, we must ask what UN the world needs today and whether current funding models are fit for purpose. The third UN80 workstream has the greatest transformative potential to realign the UNDS, if this question is addressed. The UNDS’s value lies in its power to advance globally agreed norms, a function that needs to be maintained, including through predictable funding. The authors call for strengthening and expanding the use of assessed contributions by re-examining the formula for allocating fiscal obligations among UN member states and extending softer forms of earmarking. In essence, countries get the UN they fund.
The author reflects on the recently released Mandate Implementation Report (MIR), which offers a systemic perspective on a longstanding issue inside the UN system: mandate overload. UN mandates tend to persist but this persistence does not come with flexibility and resourcing, resulting in an ever-expanding list of responsibilities unsupported by the means to fulfil them. This creates to a situation where normative outputs substitute for impact, and mandates become ends in themselves rather than tools for change. The author argues that report’s findings will carry little weight unless member states confront the political discomfort of relinquishing mandates. Without a collective shift in political will, any reforms risk becoming cosmetic.
The author proposes three criteria for member states to determine “what makes a mandate effective”. First: The willingness by member states to pay for it. If they don’t want to pay, that suggests a “pretty thin level of consensus” and perhaps an influence from “a particular group of member states, or potentially UN staff themselves, who want to be tasked accordingly.” Second: The readiness to establish a review process. If no stakeholders are available for this exercise, and the UN shows no interest in it either, this would indicate an ineffective mandate. Third: The cost from coordination must stand in a sensible relationship to the cost of implementation, which should be prioritized.
A long-time US government official, the author invokes Kennedy’s principle that aid “was work to be done largely with governments in support of their goals, not with non-government entities in pursuit of an imposed U.S. agenda.” Starting in the 1990s, however, government-to-government assistance was reduced, resources went to NGOs and (US) contractors. The side-effects included “the shrinking of the African state” and its capacities, and the emergence of a “parallel state”. Not surprisingly then, African politicians and intellectuals see in the closure of USAID an opportunity to reduce aid dependence. Also, supporting NGOs meant the donor lost leverage with governments.
The author argues that the Trump administration views the UN as a useful platform to maximise the power and influence of the US, but it feels no obligation to follow international law and norms where they clash with US national interests. Hence, US engagement in the UN will be highly opportunistic, with assessed contributions being used as a weapon to drive reform. In this context, withdrawal from UNESCO reflects a focus on prioritising culture war considerations over geopolitical contestation, such as with China, when determining US membership in international organisations. International security is prioritised over development. While the US is likely to remain in the UN, symbolic withdrawal from some organisations deemed less relevant for its national security interests can be expected.
The author sets apart institutional reforms from the politics of aid, arguing that the latter holds the key for better development cooperation. Donors have not pushed aid agencies “to do better”, and developing country governments may not embrace development for the “levelling of power relations and redistribution of wealth” it brings (including less space for corruption). The author thus argues for a less technocratic, more selective approach to development cooperation. “Opportunities include building evidence that connects aid to voters’ concerns and domestic policy goals, spotting political openings in recipient states and exploiting junctures so that leaders can make courageous decisions.”
The author argues that crisis language – marked by repeated warnings and alarmism – surrounding the UN80 process is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it can help spur leaders into action. On the other, it risks setting wrong priorities, shifting focus from transformative visions to quick fixes. It can also desensitise audiences and implicitly place blame on the UN for failing prevent and manage crises. The UN80 initiative should be reframed in terms of turbulence, strategic uncertainty, adaptation, and renewal. It should be viewed as a process of intentional evolution of multilateralism, offer models of adaptation, and build participation through sustained dialogue.
The author argues that with the shutdown of USAID, Russia is preparing to expand its global development reach beyond post-Soviet states and a few Global South allies (e.g. Cuba) to a broader range of Global South countries. Russia currently lacks a centralised foreign aid agency, but the Kremlin is considering consolidating its various aid programs under a single structure, resembling the USAID model, and presumably with increased funding. Leading this is Rossotrudnichestvo, an agency previously accused of functioning as a front for Russian propaganda. Although Russia cannot become a big aid player overnight, expanding its foreign aid could enable it to portray itself as stepping in to support countries abandoned by the US.
The authors argue that the UN is facing a “the end of the month and the end of the world” dilemma, and the current liquidity crisis could render the UN80 initiative overly focused on quick wins and short-term efficiencies. Instead, UN80 should aim at reshaping the UN to address “long problems” such as climate change or debt sustainability. They offer fours ways to achieve that: 1) Review mandates with an intergenerational lens, asking whether mandates are “preparing the UN to meet global risks over the next several decades?”; 2) embed foresight and long-term principles into any new design; 3) reimagine the UN as a steward; 4) invest in system change even if immediate results are limited.
Two pieces were published ahead of Waltz’s Senate confirmation hearing. Both argue that the Trump administration’s approach to the UN will significantly shape the UN’s long-term trajectory. While many member states anticipate conflict, they also expect that Waltz will articulate a US vision for the organisation and conditions under which some funding can be restored. Some diplomats believe that US budget cuts might benefit the UN by triggering reform and focus, while others worry the US is bent to make the UN irrelevant and that US disengagement opens up space for China to assert more influence over the UN.
The article reviews a UN evaluation that looks at key elements of the UN Resident Coordinator system, reformed in 2019, finding that coordination processes are still “more administrative than substantive.” The response to this should not be strengthening the RC system further, but to correct deeper dysfunctions in the UN development system. These are related to the semi-commercial, decentralized ways in which UN entities operate. The article advances three proposals: (1) Switch to an impact-driven model and focus on the UN’s unique possibilities, (2) re-centralize some decision-making, to extricate the UN from vested interests at country-level, (3) member states should “tie their hands” and restrict resource mobilization/provision at the country-level.
Amid the UN80 process and calls for drastic budget cuts, the author examines the ambivalent relationship between bureaucracy and efficiency, challenging the notion that bureaucracy is the problem. He argues that bureaucracies are essential to the functioning of multilateral systems, as they are designed to manage complexity and balance geopolitical interests, albeit with some trade-offs in terms of speed and possible friction. Cost-cutting rarely leads to better governance, as complex systems like the UN do not run well on simplified managerialism logic and metrics. Efficiency must be linked to purpose, and reform should enhance the comparative advantage of the UN.
The author dissects the UN80 initiative, focusing on the strengths, challenges and the outlook linked to each reform element. Some key points: He argues that cuts should be based on effectiveness rather than applied uniformly. Managing the “human element” of reform (staff) is critical to both the operational and reputational outcomes of UN80. The reform should address deep-rooted power imbalances. Inclusivity must be structurally embedded in the process, not treated as an afterthought. That means setting up formal consultation tracks and allocating resources for civil society participation, ensuring that its input informs not only design but also implementation of reform.
The article offers an optimistic take on the UN’s normative role. It concerns itself with the UN’s peacekeeping activities, but what it argues may also be applied to its development system. The main message is that the current contestation of international norms “is not just a challenge but an opportunity to renew the liberal international order.” Norms grow through contestation. Three suggestions are advanced: all reform proposals should make links to the UN’s founding values; the UN should embrace norm discussion, which requires inclusive platforms; the UN system should systematically reflect on the normative impact of its activities.
The author argues that UN reforms typically fail because funding, mandates, state preferences and voting coalitions for reforms are not aligned. This also endangers the current UN80 process. He suggests a path forward. As a first step, core UN structures need to be stabilised with core funding. Member states might need to put some mandates on hold. Major donors should agree with the Global South on where to focus humanitarian and development aid. Second, a UN system-wide coordination process that brings together national priorities, global mandates, and resource availabilities should be established.
The authors argue that the Pact for the Future offers a roadmap for system-wide reforms by emphasising inclusive governance and response to global shocks. The UN80 initiative can reinforce this by focusing on the UN’s core strengths, improving efficiency, relocating staff to high-need areas, and pursuing a new grand bargain to strengthen multilateralism. The authors’ report on the progress in implementing the Pact shows slow, yet visible progress across key elements of the agreement. Moreover, specific pact actions and UN80 initiative steps can prompt momentum when they are championed by even a small number of diverse, committed member states.
The policy brief of RSIS, a research institute in Singapore, focuses on humanitarian assistance and disaster response. The author warns that streamlining of humanitarian operations “could […] regress to recentralisation, where decision-making is concentrated within a few agencies” and at headquarters level. However, in humanitarian operations, decision-making needs to be further decentralized for greater local ownership and inclusion, which are key in complex circumstances. Country-level pooled funds, such as the Myanmar Humanitarian Fund, “provide the UN80 initiative with tangible evidence that reform can deliver both greater operational efficiency and deeper localisation in humanitarian action.”
Reforms should be grounded in a normative framework, argues the author. For the UN, the normative frameworks are the Charter, complemented by the Agenda 2030, Paris Agreement, and Pact for the Future. Budget cuts should follow a holistic vision and comprehensive strategy outlining the role of the UN now and in the future. If the UN is to be a serious peace and security actor, the SC’s functions should be streamlined, with clear rules and limits on veto use and an expanded composition. Operationally, it can be more effective and efficient financially to have a reduced but authoritative UN field presence to monitor and guide better-resourced development actors, ensuring alignment with global norms and recipient countries’ interests.
Citing the Hamburg Sustainability Conference, the authors hail the newly announced German alliance for support of the UN development system. It shows to them that doing better with less is not just about efficiencies, but can also be about defending values. UN80 is an opportunity to make the UN better. It requires four things: a) a new “mutuality narrative” to explain international cooperation; b) embracing “quick wins” and “incremental action” in the name of big ambitions; c) prioritize on what works without a lot of monetary resources, such as policy changes; d) utilizing “smart partnerships”, data and technology.
The report draws on exchanges between authors and relevant actors at UN forums and meetings. Amid the realignment of world power dynamics, current policy shifts of several major donors towards transactional diplomacy and domestic prioritization raise questions about the future of multilateralism. This weakens multilateral forums’ ability to generate and implement consensus. In order to strengthen regional and global multilateral system, accountability mechanisms generating sustained trust should be promoted; meaningful participation of development stakeholders in reform processes should be strengthened; MS’ commitments should be fulfilled; coherence of the UNDS should be improved. Additionally, regional coordination spaces should be established to coordinate common priorities.
The UN80 reform is apparently discussed in newspapers around the world. The Manila Times takes a critical view of the “sweeping internal restructuring plan”. It criticizes the lack of transparency of the process, the “reckless” way and the haste in which the reform is advanced. “We have a right to know if our contributions under our membership obligations are being used judiciously, and if important UN-backed programs and projects here in the Philippines will be carried out.” The article acknowledges that the UN is an “infamously bloated and inefficient organization”, but that is clearly not the main concern of the paper.
The Charter outlines a vision of equitable access to sources of power and decision-making in the UN. During the Cold War, a balance between East and West was maintained, but since then, richer countries have expanded their influence. A major source of unequal representation are the difficulties of poorer countries (and those further away from UN headquarters) to get interns and junior staff into the UN. Relocations could help with that. Related to funding, earmarking buys richer countries access. WHO’s integrated budgeting process, where limits are defined for what the organization can accept for specific budget items, is suggested as a model other UN entities.
Palm, a former UNICEF staffer, takes aim at the UN’s wasteful approaches and lack of effectiveness. Forget about relocations, he says, and rather reduce the number of leadership positions to save money. Developing countries might like that. Based on his life-long career in the UN, he marvels why the UN celebrates its initiatives, but is conspicuously silent and intransparent about its achievements. The UN should spend much more time thinking about “the conditions that allow development to happen, and which make development aid useful and effective”. The role of aid is limited. Rather than working with consultants, the UN should have the “most intelligent, experienced and competitive” advisors.
Prof. Dr. Narlikar, an IR scholar, highlights that while current problems are relevant for the entire world, they are viewed and approached differently across geographies and identities – what might be a crisis for the West, might be an opportunity for the Global South. Current dysfunction of multilateralism is a result of global governance being out of sync with changing realities. Bringing in the Global South with an agenda-setting power could contribute to “a more secure, fairer, and kinder order”, as Global South states are not “swing states” but powers with alternative ideas. However, in order for Global South states to utilise the current crisis as an opportunity and mitigate risks associated with multipolarity, they need well-functioning, transparent, and resilient domestic institutions
The UN is currently facing funding and identity crisis. Member states have concerns: some G77 members are voicing opposition, seeing UN80 as a reflection of the will of Trump’s US, while the broad UN membership is criticising the lack of transparency – e.g. the composition of the UN80 task force has still not been disclosed. This prompts speculations about vested interests of top UN officials who might be acting not for the common good but for their own interests. The UN and its member states also show differences in how they perceive the reform: UN leadership presents it as an opportunity to rethink work methods and identify efficiencies, while delivering on the UN mandate; some member states say the UN must redefine that mandate.
Past approaches to strengthening the UN development pillar have not always worked. The RC system does not live up to expectations, because the centrifugal forces of UN agencies operating in a highly decentralized and semi-commercial way are too strong. Reforms should address “projectitis” and reorient agency’s operational models towards effectiveness and unique multilateral selling points. Specific reform options include changes to human resource (more experts, less managers), an independent evaluation function (in the model of the joint inspection unit), working from (sub)regional offices to provide solutions at scale, and generally focusing more on policy advised based on best practices around the globe.
The author suggests that transforming the UN into a more effective institution requires not only budget cuts and structural changes, it also demands debunking core myths about development aid system. First, donors are not altruists, they use aid to achieve their national objectives. Strategic relationships predict aid flows. Second, recipient governments do not always use aid as intended. These realities, combined with the lack of feedback and learning mechanisms and donor-dominated political economy of the UN work, undermine aid effectiveness. However, they are not going anywhere. Rather, the UN needs to identify overlaps in donor and recipient interests and development objectives, and leverage these opportunities.
The authors, two eminent UN scholars, describe the UN as an “unwieldy, dysfunctional family” that is sustained by vested interested. Now, “a dramatic reshaping … is unavoidable.” Rather than mere cost-cutting across the board, reforms should be guided by the UN’s true value, “which resides in ideas and select operations” – setting norms and standards, and helping member states implementing them. Based on this, a tailored approach is needed that eliminates duplication, but in a way that reflects comparative advantages. Often, UN functions are performed better by other actors. In the humanitarian field, the “extreme decentralization” of UN agencies reflects “pathologies” of the UN development system.
The author argues that the lack of structural clarity within the UN poses a barrier to meaningful reform. The complexity of the UN stems from several factors. 3600 mandates identified by the Secretariat so far reflect not only the diverse priorities of member states but also a system that rarely retires old tasks. Moreover, there is a practice of creating new positions (e.g. special envoys) in response to crisis instead of empowering existing structures such as regional offices, peacekeeping missions, and development coordination teams. Finally, the senior leadership structure – a potential area for cost-cutting – also needs to be addressed.
The author asserts that “the old model of foreign aid” is currently becoming irrelevant. Three concepts are discussed for the new era: (1) Radical simplification and focus. Instead of running dozens of programmes, concentrate on a few so that everyone can learn from them. (2) Development partnerships that take the political economy and agency of countries serious; working with governments that are not serious, is a waste. (3) Detach development from aid; the choice is between “(predominantly) doing humanitarian assistance or investing in structural economic change.” The three concepts raise doubt on the UN’s sprawling development support that is deliberately shy of politics and focuses more on social aspects than economic growth.
Using data from the 2024 SG’s report, Patz demonstrates that in 2022-2023, non-staff personnel made up a significant shadow workforce across the UN Secretariat (HQ and other offices). Amid the UN’s financial crisis and the UN80 process, cuts to regular workforce could mean shifting more work to unpaid personnel, short-term consultants, and government-funded young professional – undermining the multilateral nature of international civil service and the long-term value it can provide to the member states.
Lewis, a journalist and writer, spent months talking with UN people to understand the ‘soul’ of the organization. Everybody she meets tells tales about dysfunction and waste. She is scared to find that the UN may not only be ineffective, but contribute to problems. Drawing a parallel to Trump’s dismantling of USAID, she says a major shake-up of the UN might be needed. In humanitarian and development, there are massive financial loses as UN staff does not care. A large part of UN staff is disillusioned. The need for more effectiveness and accountability have so far been “standard demands in the hamster wheel of U.N. reform,” but rarely changed much.
The author has done a systematic review of thousands of development projects, finding that only one third has a tenable link towards economic growth. The bulk of projects focuses on some kind of social improvements. The goal should not be to improve the impact of these projects. Instead, “A new paradigm for foreign aid requires a judgment call: for each sector we aim to improve, is the intervention’s impact large enough to matter for economic growth?” Applied to the UN, this suggests ample room for consolidation and a need to refocus operational activities for development on economic matters.
Hodge, a long-term UN insider, argues that the reform risks to become yet another performative event, unless the strategic purpose of the UN gets clarified. That would include putting a question mark behind the UN’s role today as “service bureaucracy, dependent on earmarked funds, political favors, and private partnership.” She warns against relying on efforts to improve coordination; that’s just reshuffling, as long as deeper issues of voice, participation and power are not addressed. The global South and the country-level need to be engaged much more, power in the UN system needs to be redistributed.
Based on interviews with UN insiders, the article warns that cuts and mergers under the UN80 initiative could hurt the UN’s normative work. The Secretariat’s human rights work is already underfunded. OHCHR receives only 5 % of the regular budget. Further cuts would not only be painful, but could also present an opportunity for China and other opponents of human rights to reduce the UN’s normative work. Gender units that exist in many departments may be “easy targets” for staff cuts.
The article argues that past reform efforts always hit a wall, and there is danger that the UN80 initiative will as well, if underlying political and structural problems are not addressed. For example: “As long as agencies are funded separately and judged on their own outputs (rather than shared outcomes), ‘integration’ will remain more aspiration than reality.” To be successful, the reforms need to realign incentives and shift power. This can’t come from the Secretariat, it’s the responsibility of member states.
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